The Obama administration and Human Rights : between international PR and American values by Domaradzki, Spasimir & Józefczyk, Piotr
Spasimir Domaradzki, Piotr Józefczyk
The Obama Administration and Human Rights: 
Between International PR and American Values
The foreign policy of the United States is considered to be a global phenome­
non and a unique case in international relations. It entails a strong and visible 
connection between American internal values, social awareness, the deci­
sion-making process and international considerations. This uniqueness con­
trasts even more strongly when compared with the foreign policies of other 
important players in international relations. Since the American Revolution, 
relying on its unique domestic values formulated in the Declaration of Inde­
pendence and the Constitution, U.S. foreign policy has been carefully crafted 
in order to meet national interests. It is also much more honest and direct 
than the foreign policies of the Great Powers in the 18th and 19th centuries.1
Together with technological advancement and growing strength, the same 
values have compelled American society to abandon its isolationism in re­
sponse to the spread of despotic ideologies around the globe. The evolution of 
these values can be traced for more than 230 years in a mixture of Christian 
principles, isolationism, Manifest Destiny’s mission, internationalism and the 
quest to defend the Free World. It seems that U.S. international activity, em­
bedded in a clear set of values and sound rationale, will be able to maintain 
its dominant position in the international relations of the 21st century. Ul­
timately, globalization itself has been a result of democracy’s domination in 
international relations after the Cold War.
However, the prospects for the near future seem to be much grimmer. The 
current American foreign policy seems to depart from its strong attachment 
to liberal values. More and more often arguments criticizing Obama’s foreign 
policy emerge as a consequence of developments in international relations. 
Although these arguments are often politically motivated, they also have
1 A sound argum ent for the uniqueness of Am erican values is made by M cCorm ick 2005: 10 
[including footnote 10].
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a  very sound empirical basis. Th ey constitute a  fi rm background for criti-
cism, additionally reinforced by the economic downturn of the United States 
and the political, economic and military growth of new rivals in the interna-
tional arena. Th ese developments bring to mind the most peculiar period of 
American history, prior to the Second World War. Part of the answer can be 
linked to the core values on which the Obama administration is building its 
foreign policy.
Already in 2009 the former U.S. envoy to the United Nations, John Bolton, 
called Barack Obama the fi rst post-American president, emphasizing his 
greater devotion to the international image and global tendencies than reli-
ance on American values. Bolton’s criticism targeted the philosophical foun-
dations of the new president’s approach towards international relations and, 
in particular, the dangerous tendency of identifying what is American with 
universal values (Bolton 2010: 19-27).
Indeed, over fi ve years ago, when President Obama took offi  ce, he was 
determined to introduce a new quality in American foreign policy under the 
omnipotent slogan of “change.” On one hand, the new administration had to 
face the diffi  cult legacy of Obama’s predecessor, in terms of declining support 
for the U.S.’s international activities and increasing internal economic hard-
ships. On the other, a strong temptation toward craft ing a “better” image of 
the United States was noticeable. Th ese preconditions seemed to be the bot-
tom line of the new foreign policy philosophy (Bolton 2010: 19-27). Daniel 
Drezner identifi es these preconditions as “strategic convictions,” which he 
summarizes as economic rejuvenation, overextended American presence 
around the globe [literally “… in all the wrong places” – SD] and the deterio-
rating U.S. image.2
Th e 2008 election of Barack Obama was considered to be a turning point 
in American foreign policy and a “new beginning” for the international im-
age of the fl agship of Western democracy. Obama’s success in the presidential 
race was directly linked with George W. Bush’s unilateral international ac-
tivities, which oft en contradicted the globally accepted principles of interna-
tional relations. Furthermore, the essence of the global war on terror and its 
supporting activities were also contradictory to the international standards 
2 Obama came into offi  ce with three fi rm strategic convictions. First, domestic rejuvenation 
was crucial for any long-term grand strategy, a  point he has stressed in all his foreign policy 
speeches. “[We have] failed to appreciate the connection between our national security and our 
economy,” Obama said in his December 2009 address on Afghanistan. “Our prosperity provides 
a foundation for our power. It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy.” Second, the 
United States was overextended in all the wrong places, fi ghting two counterinsurgencies and 
a war on terrorism in the Middle East while neglecting other parts of the globe. Th ird, the Bush 
administration’s mistakes had pushed the United States’ standing in the world to an all-time low. 
Drezner 2011: 57-68.
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of human rights protection (Roth 2010: 10-16). Hence, at least partially, 
the contemporary roots of anti-Americanism stem from the assessment of 
American actions in international relations around the world. Since the Bush 
administration fl agrantly neglected the standards of international human 
rights promoted by the Western world, he simply provided “useful” examples 
revealing the “Western hypocrisy,” and thus strengthened the arguments for 
anti-Americanism.
Th e two wars, deteriorating economic conditions and tangible decline 
of sympathy for the United States provided Barack Obama with a suffi  cient 
amount of arguments, which he used during the election campaign to con-
vince the majority of Americans that he is the one able to make a diff erence. 
Every election campaign is a battlefi eld of ideas and promises, where the more 
convincing and trustworthy candidate wins. Th e main credo of the Obama 
campaign was change, and this was what the general public expected from 
him – including the foreign dimension. Furthermore, even if the internal and 
international condition were not favorable for the new president, Obama was 
aware of the challenges and had enough time to set up his own set of priori-
ties, agenda, and strategy, and to select the most appropriate means and tools 
by which to accomplish his aims.
Th e main directions of Obama’s change in U.S. foreign policy concerned 
the improvement of the economic situation in the United States and repair 
of the American image abroad. It included improving relations with Euro-
pean partners and, in particular, with Germany, France and Russia, replac-
ing Bush’s unilateralism with multilateralism, and introducing much milder 
and consensual policies which were supposed to ease the tensions in inter-
national relations. Obama was also willing to improve the negative record 
of open confrontation with Bush’s “axis of evil” and openly anti-American 
pariahs such as Venezuelan Hugo Chavez. American foreign policy was also 
supposed to drift  towards greater respect for international commitments 
and a policy of consensus rather than unilateral dictate and the search for 
new forms of international activism. Th erefore, Obama’s presidency was sup-
posed to change and reshape American foreign policy, to improve the image 
of the country abroad, thus reinforcing the dominant and leading position of
the Western world in international relations. Part of these expectations 
was the hope that under the new president, the United States would decrease 
its determination to achieve everything immediately and would return to 
“common sense” international relations.
Th eoretically, behind the concept of multilateralism there is a hidden pre-
sumption that close cooperation and commonly agreed international actions 
possess more legitimacy and decrease the threats posed by the realist “anar-
chic” order. Th e idea that actions are a result of consensus and careful evalua-
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tion of each case aims to consider the interests of particular states in interna-
tional relations and through international norms, to establish a clear legal and 
politically acceptable framework. Naturally, within this context human rights 
should not be forgotten. Hence, Obama’s administration was supposed to re-
ignite global enthusiasm for the United States by ending unilateralism and 
returning to a pursuit of a common international meaning.3 During his Oslo 
Nobel Prize speech, President Obama reinvigorated those hopes by claiming 
that “… the United States cannot insist that others follow the rules of the road 
if we refuse to follow them ourselves.” He also affi  rmed the U.S. government’s 
respect for the Geneva Conventions.4 However, his fi rst term record creates 
a very diff erent picture.
The fi rst term and human rights: between demagogy 
and reality
One of the characteristic features of American foreign policy is its identifi ca-
tion with the president in offi  ce and his administration. For many people, 
the reasons for the growing anti-Americanism during the Bush administra-
tions were identifi ed with the unpopular, peculiar and rather negative image 
of the president and his aides, and particularly with the means used within 
the framework of the war on terror, undermining the axiology of univer-
sal human rights. Th us, the popular worldwide support for Barack Obama 
was rooted in the belief that the new president would bring a new quality of 
American leadership into international relations, diminish the use of force 
and return to multilateralism as a key principle in U.S. foreign policy. Th ese 
seemed to be the popular expectations for solutions to the American aggres-
siveness and arrogance associated with the Bush administration.
Obama’s doctrine?
Another important source of criticism of Obama’s administration’s foreign 
policy is the lack of a long-term strategy for the role of the United States in 
international relations. While summarizing the negative comments, Daniel 
3 See: Skidmore 2012: 43 [footnote 1]; see also: Lobe 2008; Kerler 2008.
4 Compare: “Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize,” Th e White 
House, September 10, 2009. Quoted also by Roth 2010.
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Drezner provides an attempt to identify the general trends in Obama’s activi-
ties (Drezner 2011: 57-58). He recognizes not one, but two strategies marking 
the path of America’s international activities since 2009. “Th e fi rst strategy, 
multilateral retrenchment, was designed to curtail the United States’ over-
seas commitments, restore its standing in the world, and shift  burdens onto 
global partners. Th is strategy was clearly articulated, but it delivered under-
whelming policy results,” and the second “… is focused on counterpunching” 
(Drezner 2011: 57-58).
Drezner’s approach exemplifi es the inconsistency of actions within the 
fi rst strategy, which naturally leads to the necessity of applying the second 
one. Indeed, the United States’ overseas commitments played a pivotal role in 
the deterioration of the American image abroad. However, instead of a new 
doctrine, Obama’s fi rst strategy appeared to be an ideologically biased short-
term policy, aimed at undermining the political activities of the former presi-
dent as having been wrong in substance. No matter how negative the general 
assessment is of Bush’s military escapades in Afghanistan and Iraq, at least 
the former had an understandable national security rationale. Secondly, the 
idea of multilateralism in a deeply polarized world, where anti-Americanism 
is a formula for political success, meant nothing more than giving up ground 
to those players who were less attached to any values. Th e presumption of 
Obama’s aides that multilateralism would enhance support for American 
global leadership was devastated by the much less fl exible foreign policies 
of the other important regional players. One can hardly imagine that only 
because of the American elections the former Venezuelan president, Hugo 
Chavez, would have abandoned his policy of depicting America as the Devil 
on earth, or that Iranian President Ahmadinejad would terminate, or at least 
reveal, his nuclear program as a sign of good will. Th e Obama administra-
tion had to decide how to cope with the Afghan/Iraqi legacy and to carry 
the political costs of any action. However, the concept of rejoining the global 
public opinion in order to improve the image of the United States was in fact 
a decision to give up the American superiority without being practically chal-
lenged.
Naturally, the second strategy defi ned by Drezner as “counterpunching” 
needed to be implied, because comparatively weaker political adversaries saw 
an opportunity to take advantage of the U.S.’s self-restricting actions and to 
promote opportunities and solutions fairly contradictory with American val-
ues and, respectively, interests. Th us, the Obama administration was urged 
to reassess its international activities, seeing the devastating consequences 
of a political retreat for short-term PR benefi ts. Th e counterpunching became 
a logical consequence of the refl ection that others are not going to naively fol-
low the USA’s preaching, but will pursue their own interests in the global en-
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vironment. Th us, the counterpunching had to be embedded in the same old 
values, which were gladly abandoned as deviations of Bush’s administration.
In a sense, a symbolic moment of this metamorphosis of Obama’s foreign 
policy was his visit to Poland, which was criticized by Obama’s administration 
because Warsaw had been a staunch ally in George W. Bush’s war on terror. 
Once the question of values was reformulated by Obama in late 2010, Poland 
was back from the wilderness.5 Th is tendency was also visible in the more 
assertive attitude towards China in the case of Chen Guangcheng and restric-
tive actions against the Russian ruling elites involved in the case of Sergei 
Magnitsky (Kramer, Shevtsova 2012). Th us, aft er the preliminary period of 
radical modifi cation of U.S. foreign policy, the Obama administration had to 
evaluate the gains and losses and reconsider its philosophy aft er being able
to see the undesirable eff ects of its preliminary calculations. Washington’s re-
lations with Beijing and Moscow provide interesting examples in this respect.
China and Obama’s human rights record
A major role in the shaping of President Obama’s foreign policy was played 
by the economic crisis which was an acute internal problem requiring either 
prompt resolution or prospective defeat in the quest for reelection. In order 
to handle this challenge, President Obama introduced a policy of closer rela-
tions with China, aiming the involvement of the PRC’s fi nancial resources 
towards providing fi nancial security for the American economy, thus secur-
ing the fi nancing for his crisis management activities. As Hillary Clinton 
stated in February 2009, “… human rights ‘can’t interfere’ with other U.S. in-
terests in China” (Roth 2010).
However, American relations with China seem to constitute an unsolvable 
riddle. On one hand, during Obama’s fi rst mandate, the United States decided 
to confront China’s growing geopolitical infl uence by strengthening its mili-
tary presence in the Far East. On the other, President Obama’s administra-
tion’s numerous meetings with China’s offi  cials revealed a pragmatic attitude 
based on the supremacy of economic considerations in the mutual relations. 
At the same time, on a number of issues directly linked to the question of 
human dignity, which constitutes a core American value, the U.S. president 
was ready to step back in order to secure Chinese support for his attempts to 
improve the economic situation on a national level.
5 For Obama’s visit to Poland, see: Ostrowski, Smoczyński 2011; Stępień 2011.
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Th e side eff ect of this Chinese-American rapprochement was a gradual 
exclusion of the human rights questions from the mutual agenda. Th e case 
became visible aft er President Obama refused to meet the Dalai Lama in 
Washington D.C. in 2009, slightly less than a month before his visit to Beijing. 
It was, as the Daily Telegraph described it, “to keep China happy.”6 In this way, 
Barack Obama became the fi rst U.S. president to postpone a meeting with the 
Dalai Lama since 1991.7
However, what Obama’s administration sacrifi ced in this case was much 
more than a meeting with a popular leader of an oppressed nation. Th e Dalai 
Lama’s impact on the situation in Tibet and in the overall region should not 
be overestimated. Nevertheless, every American president welcomed him for 
a completely diff erent, even if symbolic, purpose. Th e short meetings with the 
Tibetan spiritual leader aim to emphasize the position of the United States 
concerning the equality of states, attachment to human rights and the readi-
ness to support any oppressed group or nation. Th ey also tend to underline 
the fact that the United States was not linking the questions of values to the 
international mainstream and was ready to send a sound signal to violators 
of these values. Th is was no longer the case. Although later, amid typical Chi-
nese criticism and threats of deteriorating mutual relations, Barack Obama 
met the Dalai Lama twice in February 2010 and July 2011, the earlier mistake 
could hardly be repaired, because values are not negotiable.8
Furthermore, even Obama’s Nobel Prize of 2009 was not obliging enough 
to criticize Beijing’s decision not to allow the Chinese dissident and human 
rights activist Liu Xiaobo to be released and to attend the 2010 Nobel Prize 
ceremony. Th us, the U.S. administration sent a clear signal to China’s com-
munist authorities that values can also be traded when it comes to short-
term economic and political objectives. Beijing understood that signal not 
as an improvement in bilateral relations, but as a carte blanche for conducting
an unrestrained policy of intimidation for political or religious nonconform-
ism in China.
President Obama visited China for four days in November 2009. During 
his visit he refrained from addressing the state-orchestrated policy of assimi-
lation of Uyghurs in Xinjiyang province, where resettlement of the Chinese 
Han population, linked with destruction of the Uyghurs’ historical heritage, 
caused riots and civilian victims. His failure to address the questions of hu-
man rights in the context of Tibet or political repressions, freedom of ex-
6 See: Spillius 2009.
7 See: “Obama Meets with Dalai Lama Despite Chinese Objections,” CNN, February 19, 2010.
8 On the Obama-Dalai Lama meetings, see: note 14 supra and MacAskill, Branigan 2010; 
“Obama Meets with Dalai Lama Despite…”; and the White House Press Releases: Lee 2010; Schul-
man 2011.
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pression and religious freedom were immediately stressed by observers and 
analysts.9
Another moment during Obama’s visit to China described by Kenneth 
Roth portrays the place of values in the hierarchy of priorities of the presi-
dent’s early fi rst term.
Before a handpicked audience of “future Chinese leaders” in Shanghai, he spoke of 
the United States’ journey up from slavery and the struggles for women’s and work-
ers’ rights, making clear that the United States, too, has a  far-from-perfect human 
rights record. He affi  rmed the United States’ bedrock belief “that all men and women 
are created equal, and possess certain fundamental rights.” However, in a question-
and-answer session, he seemed to suggest that China’s draconian “great fi rewall” 
on the Internet was a  refl ection of diff erent “traditions,” rather than demanding 
that it be torn down. Th at remark led to a  storm of criticism from Chinese blog-
gers, and Obama left  the country appearing to be in thrall to Chinese economic power
and barely interested in risking anything to protect the rights of the 1.3 billion Chi-
nese still living under a dictatorship (Roth 2010).
Attempts to weaken the negative impression of Obama’s human rights re-
cord of this visit can be noticed in the argumentation provided by Elizabeth 
Lynch, who argued that Obama was talking about human rights both pub-
licly and privately, but the Chinese were not listening.10
Unconsciously, Lynch raises a very important point: Why, in fact, did the 
Chinese not listen? One explanation could be that Beijing did not have to, 
because it was aware that the mutual relations were focused on a completely 
diff erent set of issues, wherein both sides see ground for mutually promising 
cooperation, which has nothing to do with human rights. Th us, by adding in-
ternal economic hardships to the bilateral agenda, the Obama administration 
had to make a concession with its own principles.
Obama’s administration quite quickly realized that the abandonment of 
human rights issues was not the key to improving American credibility, and 
as Evan Feigenbaum reported in Th e Guardian, in spite of Obama’s eff orts in 
the fi rst year to build confi dence, “there is an enduring lack of trust and con-
fi dence on both sides.”11 Once this was realized, Obama returned to gestures 
of caring about human rights by meeting the Dalai Lama. Th e subsequent is-
sues on individual cases of public attorneys being persecuted in China and, in 
particular, the case of Chen Guangcheng12, steadily increased the tensions be-
9 Obama was accused of kowtowing to China on human rights issues. Th is was aptly sum-
marized in Politico, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/27942.html, and quoted by Th e 
Guardian as “Bottom Line: Don’t Piss Off  Your Banker”; Weaver 2009.
10 See: Lynch 2009.
11 See: MacAskill, Branigan 2010.
12 See: “China’s Blind Activist Chen Guangcheng,” BBC News, May 19, 2012; Buckley 2013.
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tween Washington D.C. and Beijing. However, it is not appropriate to blame 
human rights rhetoric for creating obstacles in mutual relations. Th e general 
tendency in mutual relations was not dependent on human rights consider-
ations. Rather, a compilation of much more pragmatic geopolitical evaluation 
and unsolved problems such as the trade surplus, arms sales to Taiwan, the 
value of the Chinese currency and Iranian sanctions have forced Washington 
to take the necessary political and strategic steps to improving its position to-
wards China’s growing ambitions. Obama’s visit to Myanmar, Cambodia and 
Th ailand in November 2012 is of signifi cant importance. Although China 
and the United States claimed that it had no impact on mutual relations, for 
Washington it was an opportunity not only to “renew old friendships,” but 
also to open up new geopolitical perspectives. Especially the visit to Myan-
mar, supporting the process of democratization, can provide new opportuni-
ties for Washington in the closest proximity of China.
Th e Pacifi c reorientation of U.S. foreign policy has been taking place for 
already several years. Th e establishment of a  U.S.  military base in Austra-
lia and active political and military involvement in Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan are only part of what Leon Panetta has called “eff orts to strengthen 
alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacifi c to advance a common security 
vision for the future.”13 However, it did not necessarily go together with the 
American demand for human rights during the fi rst years of Obama’s presi-
dency (Kurlantzick 2010: 9).
“Reset”
Similarly, Obama’s administration searched for a new quality in its relations 
with the Russian Federation. Th e famous “Reset” was embedded in the same 
philosophy aiming to introduce more pragmatic relations by abandoning the 
former administration’s political activities, causing tensions between Wash-
ington and Moscow.14 George W. Bush’s attachment to the Missile Defense 
System and NATO’s eastward expansion were considered to be unneces-
sary and provoking activities. Instead, new challenges of mutual importance 
needed to be faced and Moscow was an indispensable partner. Without Rus-
sian approval, the American military activities in Afghanistan could be dis-
turbed by logistic obstacles. However, what was even more important was the 
13 See: O’Malley, Garnaut, Welch 2012.
14 For more details, see: “Button Gaff e Embarrasses Clinton”, CNN News, March 7, 2009; 
Crabtree.
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renewal of the legal bonds securing the Russian nuclear arsenal. From this 
perspective, the signing of the Treaty between the United States of Ameri-
ca and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Off ensive Arms in April 2010 proved that the “Reset” 
managed to accomplish its aim. It was, as Michael Weiss calls it, “… the one 
tangible accomplishment of the reset – in retaliation for the placement of an 
American missile defense shield in Eastern Europe.”15
However, the geopolitical concessions did not lead to a practical improve-
ment in mutual relations. Aft er the Libyan military operation and the death 
of Muammar Gaddafi , Moscow felt cheated and took a much fi rmer position 
on the political situation in Syria. Th e reinforcement of the Russian infl uence 
in Ukraine and Georgia and the Moscow relations with Teheran proved that 
the Russian perspective on the “Reset” meant making room for the reestab-
lishment of the Russian sphere of interests.
Th e Obama administration was not hesitant to criticize the mockery 
which Putin made of democratic principles by becoming the Russian presi-
dent again, strengthening his position by destroying non-governmental or-
ganizations and continuing repressions of the media. Remarkably, once the 
Obama administration decided to return to the language of human rights 
with the introduction of the Magnitsky Law, the “Reset” was replaced by the 
same rhetoric known from the Cold War or the G. W. Bush period.16
As in the Chinese case, Russian-American relations exemplify the con-
sequences of a euphoric pursuit of contemporary pragmatism with the un-
intended consequences weakening the American position in international 
relations.
The war on terror
George W.  Bush’s war on terror is considered to be the most recognizable 
symbol of American unilateralism and arrogance. During his election cam-
paign, Obama echoed these international concerns and made promises to 
handle the matter by closing the Guantanamo U.S. Military Base detention 
center for “enemy combatants,” which had become one of the most prominent 
examples of the American image of hypocritical behavior in international 
relations. Th e establishment of the detention center for insurgents within 
the framework of the so-called “war on terror” was a practical response to
15 See: Weiss.
16 Valuable analysis of the Reset policy is made by Sestanovich 2012.
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the contemporary challenges of asymmetric warfare, which are still not set-
tled by international law. Th is unresolved issue was, and still is, internation-
ally condemned as an unacceptable violation of the international principles 
of human rights. Th us, Obama’s campaign promises were perceived as a dec-
laration of a  fundamental shift  in American foreign policy. Indeed, among 
the fi rst documents signed by President Obama were three executive orders 
addressing the essence of the war on terror’s international criticism: closing 
Guantanamo Bay, banning torture by ending the Bush administration’s CIA 
program of enhanced interrogation methods and establishing an interagency 
task force to lead a systematic review of detention policies and procedures, 
and a review of all individual cases.17 However, this optimistic rush turned 
out to be premature and dangerous. John McCain accurately commented that 
“… the decision needed to consider what would happen to the prisoners held 
at Guantanamo before ordering the facility to be closed.”18
However, over four years later the detention facility in Guantanamo still 
exists. Although Obama introduced some technical changes concerning 
military commissions and has pressured to clarify the status of the detained 
individuals, he eventually resigned from closing the camp. His administra-
tion tends to blame Congress for depriving the necessary fi nances in order to 
execute the order, but it seems that the reason is buried somewhere else. Th e 
alternative for Guantanamo is supposed to be a detention facility in the Unit-
ed States. Th us, apparently Obama wishes to eliminate the symbol but does 
not have a solution for how to deal with the essence of the problem, which 
is indefi nite detention.19 It seems that, ultimately, the Obama administration 
has understood the practical complications which preceded the idea of the 
Bush administration to establish Guantanamo and the fact that it was an at-
tempt to provide a practical solution to a vague and unclear challenge for the 
United States. Th us, despite his earlier promises, Obama preferred continu-
ity in American foreign policy, simultaneously putting the responsibility on 
Congress for the unfulfi lled promise. What seems to have appeared from be-
neath the Executive orders is an attempt at a prompt PR success without the 
necessary diligent analysis of consequences stemming from political actions.
President Obama was also devoted to improving the American image 
abroad in an attempt to diminish the spread of anti-Americanism and to re-
invigorate relations with a number of important partners dismayed by the 
17 Executive orders of 22.1.2009, no.: 13491 Ensuring Lawful Interrogations; 13493 Review 
of Detention Policy Options; and Executive Order – Review and Disposition of Individuals De-
tained at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, http://www.white-
house.gov/briefi ng-room/presidential-actions/executive-orders?page=15.
18 See: “Obama Signs Order to Close Guantanamo Bay Facility,” CNN Politics.com, January 
22, 2009; and also Malendowski 2012: 550-551.
19 Compare: Greenwald 2013; Greenwald 2012.
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Bush administration. Th us, the relations between the U.S. and key European 
players such as France and Germany were supposed to reaffi  rm the impor-
tance of the transatlantic ties. Indeed, Obama’s fi rst visits to Paris and Berlin 
were spectacular “celebrity-like” appearances, aiming to meet the European 
expectations, but they ultimately did not lead to noticeable improvement in 
the bilateral and transatlantic relations. Simultaneously, the new administra-
tion started cutting off  ties with Bush’s “war on terror” allies as an incon-
venient ballast depriving Obama’s administration of the ability to maintain 
ultimate fl exibility in international relations.
Th e reorientation of Obama’s foreign policy was also forced by the com-
mon priorities with Russia in Afghanistan and the urgent need to reaffi  rm 
the mutual guarantees for securing nuclear arsenals. His attempt to bring the 
relations with Moscow to a  new level overshadowed events in the Middle 
East, where Obama’s speeches emphasizing the universal values of human 
rights were confronted by the rise of radical Islamist movements that were 
much more dangerous than the old authoritarian regimes. President Obama 
was also not able to exercise the necessary pressure on Israelis to return to ne-
gotiations aimed at fi nding a solution to the “unsolvable” Israeli-Palestinian 
confl ict.
Furthermore, a number of issues which had a direct impact on the dete-
rioration of transatlantic ties during the Bush administration remained unre-
solved, since the American position during Obama’s fi rst term was practically 
not modifi ed. Apart from the already discussed question of Guantanamo and 
the alleged CIA human rights violations, Europeans were expecting signifi -
cant improvement in the attitude of the United States towards the Interna-
tional Criminal Court’s effi  ciency,20 the U.S.  position on the Ban of Land 
Mine Convention and the collapse of the Kyoto Protocol. In all of these ques-
tions, the American position did not evolve considerably if compared to the 
status quo during Bush’s presidency. Th us, on a number of issues U.S. foreign 
policy remained on the same course, reaffi  rming the legitimacy and rationale 
of the Bush administration. 
However, in his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama de-
clared the establishment of a new level of relations between the U.S. and the 
EU, which might become not only a turning point in transatlantic relations, 
but also an important change in the U.S.’s attitude towards Europe. Th is, how-
ever is a perspective for the future and the recent list of achievements is much 
20 Although the Obama administration emphasizes essential improvement of the American 
attitude towards the ICC, in terms of ceasing conscious obstruction of the Tribunal activities and 
providing assistance in response to specifi c requests, no practical steps have been made either 
since the United States re-signed the Rome Statute or became a member of the ICC. See also: 
Domaradzki 2012: 205-214.
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shorter. As John Bolton admits, “… on a number of issues Obama’s foreign 
policy practically didn’t change and where it happened it had rather a dete-
riorating impact for the notion of human rights in the U.S. foreign policy.”21
Conclusion
Th ese selective examples of American foreign policy during the Obama ad-
ministration depict a complicated picture of American priorities, in which 
human rights are not necessarily among the primary sources of U.S. activities 
abroad. Th e economic crisis and the extremely negative image of American 
foreign policy in international relations have shaped the scope of possible ac-
tivities for the Obama administration. A clear position on human rights had 
to be reconciled with the urgency of the economic factor.
Th e United States is still a unique player in international relations, being 
the only country to directly link its foreign activities with internal values. Th e 
Obama administration had a remarkable chance to reinstate the American 
leadership in the global competition for moral values. However, due to inter-
nal diffi  culties, it seems that another compromise was made. Unlike the Bush 
administration, which sacrifi ced human rights on the altar of national secu-
rity, based on the urgency of the day and the need to establish sound policies 
in times of “war on terror,” the Obama administration traded these values for 
fi nancial security and a more accommodating approach towards those inter-
national partners who were not supportive of Washington. Oft en comments 
can be heard that Obama’s second term should bring many more results in 
the fi eld of values and, in particular, human rights. Time will show if this is 
going to be the case, but a lesson should be learned. Oft en economic oppor-
tunities are not in line with values. Th e more these values are suspended for 
economic gain, the more they become a useless utopia, and then John Bolton 
is proven to be right.
Foreign policy is a set of internal convictions, ideological presumptions, 
tactical moves and strategic vision. In each case, the appropriate set of pro-
portions determines its fi nal shape and allows the accuracy and eff ectiveness 
of political activity to be evaluated. In the case of Obama’s administration, it 
seems that it is too early to draw fi nal conclusions, but certain preliminary 
remarks can be made.
21 John Bolton explains this tendency with the brute force of reality rather than Obama’s per-
sonal inclinations. See: Bolton 2013.
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David Milne describes Obama as a  person who “… abhors absolutism 
and is comfortable with pursuing policies that test and probe, reaping in-
cremental progress, rather than those that seek to unveil or validate univer-
sal truths. Th e world is uncertain and constantly evolving. Framing policies 
informed by modesty and provisionality is the best way to avoid dangerous 
confl ict” (Milne 2012: 937). Indeed, this seems to be a conscious and tem-
pered intellectual approach, but the question is whether it matches the posi-
tion, perspective and image of the world’s only superpower leader. Joseph 
Nye recalls a Brookings Institution publication acknowledging that Obama 
had an “activist vision of his role in history,” intending to “refurbish America’s 
image abroad, especially in the Muslim world; end its involvement in two 
wars; off er an outstretched hand to Iran; reset relations with Russia as a step 
toward ridding the world of nuclear weapons; develop signifi cant coopera-
tion with China on both regional and global issues; and make peace in the 
Middle East.” But his record of achievements in these issues has been mixed 
(Domaradzki 2008).
Already during his election campaign, Barack Obama announced that he 
was ready to speak with everybody, including all the rogue states and openly 
hostile leaders around the globe, such as Hugo Chaves and Mahmoud Ah-
madinejad.22 Th is attitude was supposed to bring a new, inspiring and pre-
sumably peaceful attitude into international relations. Remarkably, none of 
these leaders changed their anti-American rhetoric, most probably because 
this hatred is their raison d’être.
Once in the White House, Barack Obama decided to soft en the rhetoric 
of American foreign policy, particularly towards those who had criticized the 
Bush administration the most openly. What was omitted, though, was
the fact that the criticism of non-democratic regional players such as Russia 
or China was not caused by the Bush’s administration’s disrespect for univer-
sal human rights, but because his activities directly undermined the regional 
interests and positions of these countries. Th us, Obama’s diplomatic rhetoric 
was perceived by Beijing and Moscow as a sign of weakness and uncertainty, 
rather than good will or a new era in post-Bush international relations.
Th e smoothness and fl exibility of the Obama administration were a part 
of the “principled pragmatism” justifi ed by Hilary Clinton at Georgetown 
University (Roth 2010). Th e question is, how much pragmatism is appropri-
ate in U.S. foreign relations with non-democratic states? It seems that prag-
matism is a tool for making appropriate choices when the existing conditions 
are not dependent on one’s ability to have an impact on them. Being still the 
only global superpower, this approach seems absolutely inappropriate. How-
22 Domaradzki 2008.
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ever, pragmatism leads to fl exibility and fl exibility forbids a detachment to 
values, because they naturally stiff en it. Th is is where Obama’s human rights 
arguments became a loft y ideal detached from American foreign policy.
Th e results of this mistake appeared rapidly. China and Russia actively 
crushed every attempt to bring change into their societies, Europeans contin-
ued to mistrust Americans under Obama, and the authoritarian rulers of re-
gional American allies became worried about their future, reminiscing about 
the confusion of the Carter administration’s reliance on human rights.
Subsequent American appeals for freedom of the internet or the recall-
ing of human rights in Obama’s speech in Cairo confronted the reality of 
increased state control on the internet in non-democratic countries and the 
rising popularity of radical Islamist alternatives to Western secularism in 
Egypt. Th e pragmatism explains also the American attitude towards Syria, 
where the thousands of people killed in the civil war are not enough to gener-
ate suffi  cient international determination to cease the slaughtering. Instead, 
the pragmatic approach of Obama tends to assure Moscow that no geopoliti-
cal changes will occur which might reconfi gure the Middle Eastern riddle.
Th e curse of Obama’s multilateralism is that it is doctrinally linked to the 
innovative “smart power,” which is supposed to link hard power with the abil-
ity to gain the appropriate political environment in international relations 
stemming from soft  power. Joseph Nye’s recognition of soft  power is an un-
questionable contribution to the research in international relations. Th e curse 
of this term, however, is that many scholars have decided that soft  power 
can be programmed, managed and exploited. Th e fact is that the more eff ort 
is put into enhancing soft  power, the more it becomes cheap propaganda. 
Th erefore, smart power, being logically inconsistent, cannot meet the de-
mands of contemporary international relations.
Joshua Kurlantzik makes the point that “… owing to a  range of factors, 
from the global recession to the rise of China, the age of global human-rights 
advocacy has collapsed, giving way to an era of realism unseen since the days 
of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon” (Kurlantzick 2010). Indeed, there is 
no high tide for human rights in international relations, but Obama’s adminis-
tration decided to go with the fl ow of cost-calculated pragmatism, rather than 
standing for the core American principles. Only aft er realizing that the costs of 
this pragmatism are too high, Obama decided to return to these values.
Obama’s pragmatism is most visible in the famous “open microphone” 
conversation with Russia’s President Medvedev in March 2012, recalled also 
by John Bolton, “where Obama asked for ‘space’ for his own political safety 
before the November election, seemingly clueless about the actual signal he 
was sending” (Bolton 2013). Some argue that this is the “kitchen” of world 
politics and no general conclusions should be made. However, it seems that 
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this is the essence of pragmatism. It is not about promoting values considered 
as pillars of who we are, but about remaining in power for another term. Th e 
question is whether these retreats from American values and concessions to 
non-democratic regimes are, as it was mentioned, caused by short-term in-
ternal political considerations, or constitute part of a wider doctrinal shift  to-
wards an interconnected world of global economic interests in which values 
become obstacles.
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